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Abstract 
Schemes to promote sustainable forest management have increasingly focused on addressing 
widespread informalities in timber production, based on the presumed links between formalisation, 
the maintenance of forest cover and local welfare. This trend is typified by the EU Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative and associated Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPA) aimed at eradicating the trade of illegal wood between partner countries and the 
EU. Yet there is concern that such initiatives might have detrimental impacts on the largely informal 
rights of local resource users. In order to inform the formalisation agenda, more detailed analysis of 
the operation of local rights, and how they might be affected by particular schemes is required.  
This paper focuses on Ghana as a country with a largely informal wood sector that has signed a VPA 
with the EU for the express purpose of rapid formalisation. Our analysis is guided by a framework for 
assessing which types of rights might be transformed by particular approaches to formalisation and 
the subsequent effect this might have on forests and people in particular local contexts. We then 
apply this framework to an in-depth local case study of on-farm timber governance within a cocoa-
forest landscape in Ghana’s Central Region to examine how the operation of formal and informal 
and substantive and procedural rights shape who controls, and benefits from, on-farm timber 
production. We then analyse the content of the VPA in light of these local realities and assess its 
potential impacts.  
Our findings highlight how the substantive rights the state grants to companies are presumed to be 
balanced with the granting of procedural rights to farmers via the mechanisms of right of refusal to 
harvest on-farm timber, compensation for damage to cocoa crops and the negotiation of 
community-level Social Responsibility Agreements with private companies. Yet a comparison of 
these formal rights with farmers’ existing informal rights reveals that farmers’ control and access to 
benefits from trees on their farms are notably higher in the ‘illegal’ chainsaw dominated informal 
sector than in the ‘legal’ state-based system. Farmers choose to maintain trees on farms both to 
shade cocoa and in anticipation of benefits from their informal sale. The VPA, however, aims to 
eradicate all informal on-farm timber production and thus threatens existing local rights and benefit 
capture while diminishing incentives to maintain trees on farm. Rather than further criminalising 
local systems of timber governance, the maintenance of tree cover and local benefit-sharing would 
be better served by 1) phasing out timber concessions on farmland, 2) abandoning the distinction 
between planted and native trees on farms and, 3) understanding, recognizing and respecting the 
existing informal rights of farmers, traditional authorities and chainsaw loggers to negotiate among 
themselves patterns of access and control of on-farm trees and timber. In general, the case study 
challenges the assertion that formalisation is requisite for sustainable forest management and 
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mandates a more nuanced and contextually informed assessment of the assumed costs and benefits 
associated with particular forms of legal and policy reform.  
Keywords: Ghana, Cocoa, Forest, FLEGT VPA, Timber, Formalisation 
 
1. Introduction 
Widespread concern for global forest loss has fuelled international demand to formalize forest 
governance and tenure, based on a presumed link between legal formalisation and sustainability 
(McDermott, 2014). This equation of legality with sustainability is particularly evident in the 
European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement (VPA) programme, which calls for the prohibition of trade in illegally produced wood as a 
means to promote environmentally and socially responsible forest governance (Lesniewska and 
McDermott, 2014). Despite growing support for formalisation, however, the literature sends mixed 
messages as to its likely impacts. On the one hand, formalisation has been promoted as a means to 
support productive investments and sustainable land management practices, protect fragile rights, 
enable economic engagement and prevent over-exploitation of resources (De Soto, 2000; Hansen et 
al., 2015; Kishor and Lescuyer, 2012; Soule et al., 2000). On the other hand there are significant 
concerns regarding the increasingly intense pursuit of formalisation in a natural resources context, 
particularly regarding the ability of local users to control and benefit from those resources 
(McBarnet and Whelan, 1991; Putzel et al., 2015). For example, concerns have been raised about the 
criminalisation of legitimate but informal livelihood activities (Cerutti et al., 2013; Hauck, 2008; 
Marfo, 2010; Tschakert and Singha, 2007), the marginalisation of poor resource users who are 
unable to meet the financial and bureaucratic costs associated with formalised systems  (Hilson and 
Potter, 2005; Lagos, 1995; Maldonado, 1995), and issues of elite capture at different levels 
(Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009; Platteau, 2004; Pritchard, 2013; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). 
Given the diverse and conflicting evidence on formalisation, the assessment of its likely impacts calls 
for a more nuanced analysis that examines how existing governance arrangements shape patterns of 
control and access to benefits, and identifies precisely what types of rights are affected by 
formalisation, and how. For such purpose, this paper draws on three components of governance 
systems, which are often examined separately, to frame an analysis of the governance of on-farm 
timber in Ghana’s central region. These are 1) formal versus informal1 rights , 2) substantive versus 
procedural rights and 3) the contextual and multi-level nature of how different types of rights are 
translated into local patterns of control and benefit.  
The impetus for legal reform of Ghana’s forest sector is rooted in concerns about the impact of 
ongoing timber exploitation and the expansion of cocoa on the long-term benefits flowing from 
intact forests, including carbon storage and sequestration, provision of climatic conditions suitable 
for cocoa and biodiversity conservation (Benhin and Barbier, 2004; Ghana, 2005; Gockowski and 
Sonwa, 2011; Hansen et al., 2009; Obiri et al., 2007; Ruf, 2011; Wade et al., 2010). In addition to the 
management of forest reserves, considerable attention is focused on the informal timber harvest on 
cocoa farms, which hold a significant portion of the country’s remaining tree cover, and also serve as 
important sources of wood supply for domestic and local markets (Hansen, 2011; Hansen et al., 
2012; Marfo and Acheampong, 2011; Marfo and Schanz, 2009).  
                                                          
1 In this paper the terms formal/statutory and informal/customary are used synonymously. 
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In light of these concerns, Ghana has signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU 
with the express aim of ensuring law enforcement both in forest reserves and on farms (Community, 
2009). Given the strong international and national pressures to address informalities, it is critical to 
examine how efforts at formalisation interact with existing patterns of forest control and access. This 
paper therefore draws on a detailed case study of a Ghana cocoa-forest landscape to identify how 
actors currently control on-farm trees, and the associated distribution of benefits. We then critically 
reflect on the implications of the case study for efforts to formalize forest governance through 
international initiatives such as FLEGT.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the analytical framework employed in 
the paper and is followed by a description of the methods used in Section 3. Section 4 provides a 
national-level overview of tree and land tenure governance in Ghana. Section 5 focuses on our case 
study area, examining how the formal, informal, and substantive and procedural rights to timber 
influence the patterns of control and access to benefits of on-farm timber at a local level. Section 6 
then briefly details Ghana’s EU FLEGT-VPA and considers its implications for on-farm timber 
governance. The paper then summarizes the findings and identifies top priorities for action to 
deliver more effective and equitable governance reforms. 
 
2. Assessing the impact of formalisation on access to on-farm trees - a 
framework 
Historically, the term ‘formalisation’ has referred to the codification of informal or customary rules 
concerning natural resource rights, including ownership, access, use and trade, usually for 
recognition by the state. However, with the growth of illegal logging initiatives in the 2000s, the 
term has increasingly been used to refer more generically to the eradication of all activities not 
sanctioned by the state (Putzel et al., 2015; Weng, 2015). We argue that under both understandings, 
assessing the impacts of formalisation requires distinguishing between informal activities that are 
governed locally, from the complete absence of social order. This is particularly important in 
contexts where the imposition of state rules may override local norms, which may have evolved 
alongside formal policy agendas. 
This study recognises that ownership and related rights to natural resources are characterised by 
bundles of rights such as access, management, exclusion and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom, 
1992). But rather than map out all of these rights in their full complexity, this paper focuses on two 
distinctions that we are argue are critical for assessing the local impacts of formalisation. The first is 
between formal or statutory rights and informal or customary rights. Formal or statutory rights refer 
to those recognised in State laws, while customary rights refer to rights rooted in ‘anteriority and 
alliance’ (Cotula and Chauveau, 2007)2. The latter are considered ‘informal’ because they operate 
separately from state institutions. These informalities may be legal, where they operate in 
unregulated spaces, or illegal. However, it is important to consider the legitimacy and equity of any 
given practice, since widespread regulatory biases against small-scale operators has meant many of 
                                                          
2 This conceptualisation of informal rights is closely related to the concept of access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003), 
which refers more broadly to the ability of social actors to benefit from natural resources. The structural and 
relational mechanisms that determine access can include, but are not limited to, formal and informal rights. To 
retain conceptual clarity, this analysis focuses on how rights are commonly interpreted at the local level, but 
we highlight where relevant how the enactment of those rights are negotiated through relationships, for 
example, between landlords and tenant farmers.  
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them have found themselves operating illegally but according to arrangements that are widely held 
to be legitimate (IUFRO, 2016). These illegalities are qualitatively different from other illegalities 
such as the payment of bribes for concessions or forgery of documents. We refer to such rights as 
‘informal’ or “customary”, to avoid conflating them with other types of illegality that lack local 
legitimacy, i.e. that are not well aligned with local perceptions of fairness or shared local objectives 
(Osei-Tutu et al., 2014).  
This position aligns with the work on legal pluralism that addresses how multiple systems of rule-
making may co-exist within the same territorial jurisdiction (Hamilton-Hart, 2017; Tamanaha, 2008). 
In light of this, interrogating the interactions between statutory and customary rights is central to 
understanding how formalisation and related natural resource governance reforms are likely to 
influence patterns of benefit and control. For example, as Tamanaha (2008) notes, formal legal 
systems may lack the resources necessary to accomplish the desired changes accompanying 
formalisation processes, in which case customary rights embedded in ‘lived norms will continue to 
govern social action’.   
The second distinction in our framework, is between substantive and procedural rights. Following 
Ituarte-Lima and McDermott (In Press) we define substantive rights as those which refer to the 
allocation of rights, in this case to the ownership of, or access to, natural resources, while procedural 
rights refers to the processes and means by which those rights can be attained.  In the context of 
Ghana’s timber sector, for example, the formal substantive rights to timber are vested in the state 
and are then granted to companies through a permitting system. Farmer’s formal legal right to 
access a share of the benefits from timber on their farm is attained communally through Social 
Responsibility Agreements (SRA). The formal procedural right to negotiate a SRA rests with the 
traditional authorities, who ostensibly negotiate with the concessionaire on behalf of community 
members (Agyei and Adjei, 2017; Ayine, 2008).  
The concepts of substantive and procedural rights have largely originated within the context of 
formal legal systems but, we argue, can also be loosely applied to informal systems. That is, a farmer 
may be viewed as having locally recognized informal substantive rights when the local community 
considers it appropriate for the farmer to make choices about whether to retain or remove trees. 
The informal procedural rights of farmers refers to their locally recognized rights to make use of 
informal or traditional systems of negotiation and decision-making.  
Formal and informal and substantive and procedural rights may be interlinked in dynamic and 
complex ways. Nevertheless, distinguishing between them in a case study context allows for more 
nuanced insights into how rights are translated into patterns of control and access to benefits from 
natural resources. 
The operation of substantive and procedural rights are situated within the beliefs, practices and 
institutions of a particular culture. The distribution of the realisation of these rights in society is 
related to what McDermott et al. (2013) call ‘contextual equity’; ‘the pre-existing political, economic 
and social conditions under which people engage in and benefit from resource distributions – and 
which limit or enable their capacity to do both’. For example, the systemic disadvantages faced by 
people based on their gender, religion or ethnicity shape the realisation of rights. The consideration 
of ‘contextual equity’ facilitates a more holistic understanding of governance reforms. 
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Finally, it is important to recognise that the interactions between formal/informal and 
substantive/procedural rights operate on multiple scales and levels.3 As Mwangi and Wardell 
(2012:82) explain, accounting for the multi-level nature of governance requires devoting ‘attention 
to the links between humans and their environment, which may occur vertically (i.e. from local to 
global) or horizontally (at the same level), as well as to contestation and learning among parties with 
a stake in forests and other natural resources.’ For example, the definition of rights at a national 
level may establish ostensibly uniform legal rights and procedures, but as Sikor et al. (2010) note, 
local level actors play a key role in operationalizing the rights and duties associated with specific 
forest resources and shaping their distribution among stakeholders.  
 
3. Methods 
To explore in detail the local dynamics of on-farm timber governance a mixed-method multi-level 
case study was conducted in 6 communities in the Assin South District in Ghana’s Central Region 
between December 2013 and July 2016. The case study was purposively selected to represent 
mature cocoa-forest landscapes (where cocoa trees have been cultivated for more than 50 years). 
This is felt to be important because such landscapes represent a significant proportion of cocoa 
landscapes in Ghana and stands in contrast to popular descriptions of cocoa in Ghana as a frontier 
crop. The case was also selected as an area that had not been subject to any interventions from 
other research programs or NGO interventions to balance the bias in the literature towards field 
sites that examine interventions, for example efforts to encourage communities to support 
themselves using SRA process, that are not representative of the wider cocoa farming population.4  
The analysis which follows is principally based on a series of in-depth interviews with farmers (n = 
36, 10 of whom belonged to the indigenous ethnic group), chainsaw operators (6), and key 
informant interviews (n =10) with the Forestry Commission, COCOBOD and in-country 
environmental NGOs. A series of focus groups (6 male groups, 6 female groups) were also conducted 
which were supplemented by 2 district level and 1 national level workshops with key state and non-
state participants. The analysis also draws on interviews with UK and EU policy-makers and NGOs 
involved with forest law and policy (n = 12). The format of these interview-based methods were 
adapted to the respondent(s) but addressed questions concerning their perceptions regarding the 
governance of on-farm timber trees and relevant policy-processes. The data was analysed using 
standard qualitative techniques (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
These methods were supplemented with two household surveys conducted (in May 2015 and July 
2016) with 108 randomly sampled (gender stratified) cocoa farmers to investigate, inter alia, factors 
that influence their decisions over retaining or removing trees from farms and their perceptions 
concerning their control over chainsaw operators and concessionaries. In addition to these discrete 
moments of data collection, the local field team who managed the continuous monitoring of plots 
established for ecological data collection (see below) also collected ethnographic observations for 2 
years and recorded their interactions in the communities which enabled issues such as the 
operations of timber concessionaires in the area to be followed over time and in detail. 
                                                          
3 Following Gibson (2000) scale is understood as spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used 
to measure and study phenomena. Within these scales there are a continuum of ‘levels’. For example, the 
jurisdictional scale includes the local, regional, national and international levels.  
4 Although no data exists to accurately know how many of the 1 million cocoa farmers have been engaged by 
policy-pilots and related interventions schemes. 
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In order to contextualise the analysis of how rights shape the distribution of benefits, we estimated 
the monetary value of timber on cocoa farms in the study are by conducting a census of trees5 on 36 
60x60m spatially sampled plots on cocoa farms as well as two 1 ha plots in Kakum National Park and 
one 1 ha plot in the adjacent Attandanso Forest Reserve to provide a ‘baseline’. The cubic meters of 
timber for each tree were calculated using tree height, diameter at breast height (DBH) and a form 
function of 0.375 (this represents an average form between the two extremes, a neiloid with a form 
function of 0.25 and paraboloid, with a form function of 0.5 (Philip, 1994). Key informants (chainsaw 
operators and timber merchants) were consulted to translate this data into estimates the monetary 
value of timber trees to the farmer, in the domestic market and, for comparison, we also calculated 
the stumpage fee6.  
 
4. Rights to land and timber resources in ghana: formal rights and 
informal realities  
The Ghanaian constitution distinguishes between land and economic natural resources.7 Land is 
mostly (80-90%) held under customary ownership and, as a result, the state is not directly involved 
with questions of land governance, which are considered ‘chiefly matters’. In this way, informal or 
traditional governance arrangements concerning land are recognised under statutory law. 
Approximately 65% of land under customary ownership is Stool8 land which is effectively under 
control of the paramount chief, the remaining 35% has been alienated and is, with varying degrees 
of documentation, privately owned by families or individuals (Amanor and Ubink, 2008; GoG, 2003; 
Zhang and Owiredu, 2007). In contrast to the customary ownership of land, since independence the 
state has been responsible for granting formal substantive rights to timber via the Forestry 
Commission, to private enterprises through a permit system (summarised in table 1)9. These permits 
are granted both to timber produced in reserved forests and timber that is grown on farmland, often 
referred to as ‘on-farm’ or ‘off-reserve’ timber. The distribution of these rights is governed by the 
1998 Timber Resources Management Act (Act 547) and its amendment in act 617 in 2002 as well as 
the Timber Resources Management Regulations, 1998 (L.I 1649) and its amendment in 2002 (L.I 
1721). Where these formal substantive rights are granted on farmland, agreement is required from 
the landowner (usually the paramount chief10) with disputes being resolved by committee (see 
Section 5 of act 547).  
 
 
                                                          
5 Using the Global Ecosystem Monitoring protocols (http://gem.tropicalforests.ox.ac.uk) 
6 Stumpage fees are taxes paid by concession holders to the Forestry Commission and are based on the 
volume and value of trees  
7 Although trees are not specifically addressed in the constitution, it vests responsibility for allocating or 
exploiting mineral, water and natural resources in parliament on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of 
Ghana (Article 268).  
8 The term stool in Ghana refers to chiefly office (Berry, 2004). 
9 This has been the case since 1962. The 1962 concessions act, (Act 124: Section 16 (4)) vests all rights to 
“economic trees” in the President in trust for the Stools. This replaced a system whereby chiefs, in partnership 
with European companies, had previously been in effective control of the forest estate (Grove 1997:172). 
10 Traditional authorities in Ghana are characterised by a hierarchy headed by a paramount chief, who is 
supported by a series of sub-chiefs (divisional heads) and village chiefs (odikros).  
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Table 1. Summary of current timber permit types 
Permit type Description – key features 
Timber Utilization 
Contract (TUC) 
 Competitively tendered and subject to parliamentary ratification 
 Envisaged as the primary mode of distributing substantive rights to 
timber. Not permitted on farmland unless with the approval of the 
landowner (usually the paramount chief – see text). 
 Concessionaries are required to share the benefits accruing from 
timber revenues by providing social amenities to forest communities 
through social responsibility agreements (SRAs). 
o Farmers have procedural rights under SRAs, substantive rights 
remain with concessionaire. 
Salvage Permit  Administered and signed by the Forestry Commission and granted to 
timber companies. 
 Intended to be employed in areas undergoing development to salvage 
timber that might otherwise not be utilised, including in the cultivation 
of farms (see LI 1649 - Section 38). However, like other permits, they 
have been granted for native trees on farms that the farmers 
themselves have planted or nurtured. In such cases, farmers clearly 
have intended to utilize the trees for shade, fruit, medicine, timber or 
other purposes. Yet if the state awards a private company a salvage 
permit on their farms, farmers are given no compensation for the trees 
harvested.  
 SRAs also required under salvage permits. 
Timber Utilization 
Permits 
 Administered and signed by Forestry Commission on areas not covered 
by a TUC. 
 A small-scale permit granted to the community for communal 
purposes (such as building a school) 
 Felling undertaken by chainsaw operators with a registered chainsaw  
Special permits  Permits approved by the minister on the recommendation of the 
forestry commission in areas not suitable for TUCs or Salvage Permits.  
 There is ongoing debate about the role of such permits in the VPA.  
 
Of particular relevance to on-farm timber, the timber regulations make the distinction between 
naturally occurring trees and those that are planted, with naturally occurring timber being vested in 
the state regardless of the land ownership arrangements, while timber planted privately is formally 
recognised as belonging to the person who planted it. Consequently, the state holds authority to 
grant timber rights to private enterprises to harvest native trees on farms and farmers have more 
control over exotic species, such as teak, than native species, since it is more difficult for farmers to 
prove that native trees were planted11. Farmers usually nurture or transplant wildlings on their farm 
which are currently categorised as naturally occurring. Formally, farmers have no substantive rights 
to native trees, even though shade is a key component of cocoa management and the government 
recommends that farmers maintain 15-18 shade trees per hectare (CRIG, 2010).  
While farmers and communities lack formal substantive rights to on-farm native trees, they are 
afforded some limited formal procedural rights. These are the right to refuse permission for 
concessionaires to fell timber on their farm, compensation for damaged cocoa (Richards and Asare, 
1999) and communal benefits derived from social responsibility agreements (SRA). SRAs are made 
                                                          
11 Efforts have begun to assist farmers to register trees that they plant (Fisher, 2012). 
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between the concessionaires and land owners, and require companies to provide specific social 
amenities for local communities that live in the proposed contract area. This compensation usually 
takes the form of infrastructure like roads, clinics or schools.  
In order to compare and contrast these formal legal requirements with the informal governance of 
timber in Ghana, it is first necessary to understand their relative size and influence, as well as 
differentiate between wood sold domestically, overland via other West African countries, and 
exported overseas. Hansen et al. (2012) estimate that in 2009 the total amount of timber sold in 
Ghana, approximately 1.9 million m3 (equivalent to 6 million m3 raw wood equivalent), was six  times 
the current annual allowable cut12, and that approximately 75% of that production is used 
domestically or exported overland.13 Of the remaining 25% that is exported, only 11% was destined 
for Europe in 2016 (Ghana Forestry Commission, 2016). An estimated 84 % (Marfo, 2010) of 
domestic timber is illegal, and the majority of this illegal timber is produced by some 97,000 
chainsaw operators who process the trees into lumber on the farm, rather than in mills (Marfo and 
Acheampong, 2011).  
These high levels of illegality have been created by a policy environment focused on timber 
production for export to the relative neglect of the domestic market and the customary norms 
governing on-farm timber that have evolved over the preceding decades, most notably the blanket 
ban on chainsaw production in 1998.14 While formally rights to land and trees are separate, 
customary arrangements make no such distinction and have continued to evolve in spite of the 
criminalisation of arrangements between farmers, landowners and chainsaw operators concerning 
the management of trees on farms15. Evidently, a significant proportion of Ghana’s timber sector is 
governed by informal arrangements that are critical to understanding the likely impacts of policies 
such as the VPA.     
The subsequent section draws on our case study in the Assin South region to examine, in practice, 
the intersection of formal rights with local informal rights and resulting on-the-ground outcomes. In 
particular, we compare farmers’ degree of control over, and benefit from, trees on farms under 
formal and informal timber governance systems. 
 
 
5. Control over and benefits from trees on cocoa farms: the case of 
assin south 
5.1 Rights and patterns of control  
During the course of our field studies, we observed formal, on-farm logging in our case study area, 
which the Forestry Commission had authorized by means of a ‘salvage permit’ granted to a timber 
company16. Our comparison of formal and informal timber production thus begins with interviews 
                                                          
12 Which was increased from 1 million to 2 million m3 (raw wood equivalent) in 2004, compromising 1.5 million 
m3 from off-reserve areas and 0.5 million from forest reserves. (Oduro et al. 2014) 
13 Unpublished estimates from a Ghana-based NGO suggest 63% of domestic timber is exported overland.  
14 Through the Timber Resources Management Regulations, 1998 (L.I 1649 – Part VI) 
15 For a historical review of Ghana’s timber sector see Hansen and Lund (2017).  
16 Illegalities surrounding the granting of concessions has been the focus of some work (e.g. by Civic Response), 
but this issue is not the focus of this paper. 
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and participant observation associated with these state-sanctioned logging activities, and follows 
with analysis of the more general data collected through interviews and surveys.  
Our observation of the salvage permit corroborated previous studies, which found that while 
concessionaries are not allowed to harvest trees on farms without permission from the person with 
the right to use the land (the farmer), in practice they often do (Hajjar, 2015; Hansen, 2011). During 
and after the salvage logging had taken place, we revisited the village authorities and local farmers 
in these villages, and spoke with them about their ability to control the timber company’s activities 
on their farms. According to an Odikro17 whose village lay within the active salvage permit, many 
farmers were reluctant to give permission to the concessionaire to harvest trees on their farms, but 
felt forced by circumstances to acquiesce:  
‘Initially, we were reluctant about the timber operations [concessionaire]. But the team from the 
paramountcy and the company said the trees are state property and so our hands were tied, we had 
to agree. Initially most people were opposed, but cocoa has its seasons, during the lean season it is 
difficult so when they [the farmers] are broke they go to the [timber] company to get a little extra 
money and now most are selling their trees [to the concessionaire]’18. 
This quote illustrates how the formal system of permitting gives leverage to concessionaires to 
pressure farmers to ‘sell’ their trees (i.e. to allow the trees to be harvested in exchange for 
compensation for damage done to cocoa trees). It also highlights a range of relevant contextual 
factors. Most notably, the role of the social hierarchy associated with the paramount chiefs, as 
landowners, in facilitating the operation of timber concessions on farms.   
The extent to which paramount chiefs play a more proactive role in the distribution of formal rights, 
by inviting companies to seek concessions on their land for example, is not clear. However, 
paramount chiefs also influence control over trees informally. For example, the paramount chief in 
one of the study field sites died during the course of fieldwork, and the palace employed chainsaw 
operators to fell trees across the Stool’s land, ostensibly in order to fund the funeral and palace 
rehabilitation. 
As illustrated by these cases, the operation of formal and informal rights at supra-local (state and 
paramountcy) level undermines farmers’ ability to control the trees on their land (both removal and 
retention). Many farmers therefore resort to collaborating informally with chainsaw operators. 
These chainsaw operators are frequently maligned by non-local actors as wreakers of ‘havoc’ (Sarfo-
Mensah, 2005), or people who ‘operate at night and non-working hours in virtually every forest area 
they could find… are armed and ready to attack any person including forestry officials who dare to 
confront them’ (Boakye, 2015). Yet, as explained below, in our case study area, these relationships 
were widely held to be legitimate locally despite their informality and current illegality. 
Findings across all of our study sites (both within and outside of the above-mentioned salvage 
permit area) showed that chainsaw operators are often settled, integrated and valued members of 
communities. Every village in the study area had 3-5 permanently settled people who operated a 
chainsaw, mostly alongside farming. The reciprocal relationship between farmers and chainsaw 
operators are reflected in farmer’s attitudes towards them. Of the 36 farmers who were monitored 
closely during the course of the study none were worried about chainsaw operators removing trees 
without their permission, and all except one, who was a caretaker farmer and would need 
                                                          
17 The term Odikro means village or local chief. 
18 Interview: #15103_1. Although formally payments to farmers are compensation for damage to cocoa trees 
community members referred to, and understood, the transaction as a sale.  
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permission from his landlord, agreed that removing trees on their farms would be ‘very easy’, just 
requiring the payment of a chainsaw operator. This provides empirical support to the argument of 
this paper, that farmers have customary rights, as in locally recognized informal rights, to trees on 
farms.    
In regards to local understanding of access rights, most farmers choosing to sell their trees to 
chainsaw operators do not require permission from their landowner and landowners can equally 
choose to sell trees on their land without permission from the tenant farmer. In other words, the 
farmer and/or the landowner hold informal substantive rights to the trees. At the same time, the 
informal procedural rights concerning trees on farm are highly flexible and depend on contextual 
factors such as land tenure19 arrangements and inter-personal relationships that are shaped by, inter 
alia, individuals’ relationships of trust and reciprocity.  Nonetheless, this bundle of informal 
substantive and procedural rights usually delivers greater control to farmers than they enjoy under 
the formal concession system. Further evidence of greater local control over trees under local versus 
state-based governance is seen in the observation that farmers control over chainsaw operators 
actually increased after the government ban on chainsaw logging.20 As one cocoa farmer explained, 
‘When they used to give chainsaw operators permits, they would fell 3 or 4 trees for each permit,’ 
now ‘I don’t fear losing my trees to chainsaw operators because they cannot fell any trees without 
my permission’.  
Despite farmers holding these de facto informal procedural ‘rights’ to sell their on-farm trees to 
chainsaw operators, our study found that farmers were actively maintaining significant tree cover on 
their farms. The census of trees on farmers’ plots revealed that on average farmers had 16 shade 
trees21 per hectare, including timber species (see supplementary material 1 for table of most 
preferred and least preferred species and reasons for preferences). This is in line with the Cocoa 
Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) recommendation of 15-18 trees.  
This evidence of voluntary, on-farm tree stewardship informs ongoing debates about the role of land 
and tree tenure security in driving deforestation (e.g. (Belcher et al., 2005; Damnyag et al., 2012). 
Proponents of the argument that granting farmers substantive rights to the native trees on their 
farms would precipitate rapid deforestation appear not to recognize that farmers 1) choose to raise 
native trees from wildlings/saplings on their cocoa farms even though they lack formal rights 
ensuring they would benefit from the timber they provide and 2) already hold locally recognized and 
actionable procedural rights to harvest trees on their farms and yet chose to leave many trees 
standing. These findings are an important counter to narratives that portray chainsaw operators as 
uncontrollable criminals and farmers as powerless victims. Although this narrative may be closer to 
lived experience in some communities it is inaccurate to generalise this situation and important to 
attend to the differences among different types of chainsaw operators. This is particularly important 
given how influential simplified or partial narratives can be on policy development.  
                                                          
19 Land tenure on cocoa farms is characterised in simplified terms as occurring under two systems. The system 
of Abunu, refers to situations where land is given to someone to establish a cocoa farm and, once the farm is 
mature and productive, half the land returns to the original owner. Under the Abusa system, the farm is 
managed by a caretaker and the crop is divided into thirds, with one-third usually going to the land owner. This 
study found that land tenure arrangements, or whether farmers were local or migrant, did not have a 
significant impact on the informal rights farmers held over trees (described in the text), although these 
arrangements may be more significant in other areas of Ghana. 
20 Before 1998. 
21 Defined as non-cocoa trees >10cm diameter at breast height and >12m height. 
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5.2 Rights and the distribution of benefits  
Formally, benefits from state timber concessions are shared through the distribution of stumpage 
fees. These are distributed between the District Assemblies (55%), Administrator of Stool Lands 
(10%), Traditional Councils (20%) and Stools (25%), after the Forestry Commission has taken 40-60% 
for management fees. These fees are a small fraction of the final value of the timber, partly because 
they are not updated regularly (Birikorang, 2015). The percentage of these fees which indirectly 
reach the farmers depends on the Stool and District Assembly, but are generally considered to be 
low, effectively zero (Hansen, 2011; Hansen and Treue, 2008). In fact, none of the farmers 
interviewed were aware of any benefits related to the distribution of stumpage fees.  
Communities are also formally entitled to benefit from timber operations on their land through the 
above-mentioned Social Responsibility Agreements (SRAs). The SRAs, which are limited in value to 
no more than 5% of the stumpage fees on the concession, are designed to deliver social amenities 
and compensation to forest communities (Ayine, 2008). These agreements, again, are made with the 
landowner (usually the paramount chief) and not the farmer. Farmers do not have any explicit claim 
to compensation through the SRA process, although some of our case study respondents reported 
receiving informal payments from the company comparable to that paid by chainsaw operators (20-
50 cedis22). The Odikro of one village, where the salvage permit was granted and therefore an SRA 
process, claims that the payment reflects the customary right of the farmer to sell or maintain trees, 
but is only paid if the farmer ‘makes a lot noise’, and then it is informal, just ‘something out of their 
pockets’. However, in cases of disagreement, for example, where the concessionaire does not pay 
compensation or when they fell more trees than the farmer permitted, he said:  
‘The company tells them, if you have a problem then you have to go to your chief and to the 
government because they have given them the right to take the timber. But they can’t just go to the 
paramount chief. There is a hierarchy. You cannot just go there for some small 30 cedi dispute and 
since they [the paramountcy] have already agreed, then there’s no point’23. 
The costs of enforcing the laws on compensation are disproportionate to the value of the 
compensation itself, meaning more powerful actors can benefit from timber on farms, literally at the 
expense of the farmers. Furthermore, in the case of the salvage permit which was granted in our 
case study area, it came to light after the logging was done that the SRA had been forged. To the 
surprise of the Odikro and District Assembly man, their respective sections on the SRA forms had 
been signed and thumb printed with different signatures indicating that they had received all the 
items listed. In fact they were unaware of any agreement. Furthermore, the detailed investigations 
conducted by the local field team revealed that the original agreement had stated that the parties 
(Odikro and District Assembly) would receive 10 bags of cement, 2 packs of iron (roofing) sheets and 
1,500 cedis cash. The new agreement included the construction of 5km of trunk road, construction 
of 2 new bridges, 50 bags of cement, 2 packets of roofing sheets and 2000 cedis cash. However, to 
date (June 2017), none of the items have been delivered and felling of trees on the concession has 
been completed. This case highlights the importance of distinguishing between different kinds of 
illegality. A farmer who employs a chainsaw operator to fell a tree they nurtured on their farm to 
roof their house after a storm is operating illegally. However, that illegality is qualitatively different, 
and holds greater local legitimacy, than forging documents and refusing to pay the necessary 
                                                          
22 Approximately US$5-12. 
23 Interview: #15103_1 
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compensations. Although using the term informal introduces some ambiguity to discussions, it is 
essential to avoid conflating operations with vastly different degrees of legitimacy.  
As well as having greater control under informal systems, farmers access greater benefits from the 
trees on their farm through informal channels. One chainsaw operator summarised the widely noted 
reasons farmers prefer to work with chainsaw operators rather than contractors (concession 
holders):  
‘There are a lot of reasons; the timber contractors can spoil a lot of cocoa24, the compensation is 
lower [than selling to a chainsaw operator] because the contractor says they have already paid the 
government, the farmers get fertilizer from the saw dust, there is no or only a little damage to the 
cocoa trees and the farmer can keep or have removed as many trees as he likes’25. 
Whether the logging is done by concessionaires or chainsaw loggers, farmers receive relatively small 
sums of money from logging on their farms. Table 2 shows the estimated mean, minimum and 
maximum value of timber on farms (cedis per hectare) at different points on the value chain. This 
shows that farmers selling their trees to chainsaw operators receive approximately 4% of the value 
of the timber at point of sale in the domestic market. This is broadly comparable with the stumpage 
fee rates26, although these are low due the near absence of high value hardwood timber species on 
sampled cocoa farms. Furthermore, none of the value of the stumpage fees is paid to farmers. 
Rather, and as discussed above, farmers are sometimes paid 20-50 cedis per tree as compensation 
for associated damage to cocoa trees. 
Table 2. The estimated value of timber on cocoa farms and forest land, based on sample plot data, at 
different points in the value chain 
 Cocoa farms Forest plots 
 Mean (n = 36) Min Max Mean (n =3) Min Max 
Value of stumpage 
fee (cedis27/ha) 
526 (±118) 0 2740 1496 (± 198) 1155 1843 
 
Value of timber to 
farmer if sold to 
chainsaw operators 
(cedis/ha) 
657 (±119) 0 4042 1855 (± 280) 1310 
 
2241 
 
Value in local timber 
market (cedis/ha) 
14976 (±2795) 0 91417 36623 (±5976) 
 
25080 45080 
 
*Figures in parenthesis show standard errors of the mean. See methods section for more details on 
how these figures were calculated. 
Notably, one farm has twice the valuable timber per hectare compared to forest plots. This farm has 
been managed for timber and the farmer, a retired lecturer, has been able to protect his formal 
substantive rights to the trees on the basis that he claims to have planted the trees (and therefore 
owns them), and has been able to prevent concessionaries from taking them. This unusual case 
highlights an important point relating to contextual equity. The formal rights farmers have are most 
                                                          
24 Chainsaw operators ‘slice’ the timber into lumber on the farm which is then carried out by teams of carriers. 
This is a lot less damaging to cocoa than large-scale companies who fell the tree with chainsaws and then drag 
the whole tree out of the farm using a heavy machinery. Respondents in the household survey estimated that, 
on average, contractors damaged 31 cocoa trees per timber tree while chainsaw operators damaged 12. 
25 Interview: #15514_1 
26 N.B. Stumpage fees are paid to the forestry commission by timber concessionaries and not to the farmer. 
27 There are approximately 4.5 cedis to a dollar. 
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easily harnessed by more powerful and educated farmers. Less powerful and educated individuals 
struggle to realise their formal rights resulting in them being framed as criminals for selling their 
trees to chainsaw operators. This can further distance them from accessing benefits through formal 
channels and result in costs associated with court cases or paying bribes to officials. This case also 
emphasises the scale of potential value of timber on farms if the appropriate arrangements of rights 
is developed in a context where they can be supported.  
Although farmers receive greater benefits, and lower costs (in the form of uncompensated damage 
to cocoa) in the informal sector compared to the formal sector the payments remain a very small 
proportion of the value of the timber on their farms. Evidently, how the formal and informal, 
substantive and procedural rights are interwoven and shape the patterns of control and benefit 
distribution are complex and heavily shaped by the local context. It also illustrates how the 
uniformity and coherency of procedural and substantive rights defined at the national level are in 
fact transformed and blended with customary norms at a local level. The paper continues by 
reflecting on the implications of these findings for ongoing discussion on formalisation in the timber 
sector under the FLEGT VPA and then concludes. 
 
6. THE GHANA EU-FLEGT VPA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTROL 
OVER, AND BENEFIT FROM, ON-FARM TIMBER 
In 2009 Ghana signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union, to 
develop a legality licensing system as a means to eradicate illegal timber production. The VPA 
includes a definition of legal timber which covers, inter alia, only the types of timber concessions 
and permits allocated by the Forestry Commission and therefore only timber produced by 
companies in possession of a concession is recognized as legal (e.g. see Table 1). This includes on-
farm timber concessions and, as explained above, excludes chainsaw logging. A brief overview of 
how the VPA is to be operationalized reveals its potential impacts on farmer access to, and control 
over, on-farm timber. 
A core provision of the VPA is a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS), including a wood tracking 
system (WTS). The TLAS is intended to provide an auditable chain of custody for timber that covers 
imports, pre-felling procedures, felling, processing through to point of sale. Once the TLAS is 
operational, and receives approval from the EU, timber that conforms to its requirements will bear a 
FLEGT license. Only FLEGT licensed timber will then be allowed into EU markets. Given the EU’s 
anticipated requirements for legality licensing (Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005) much of the 
effort in operationalizing the VPA to date has been channelled into developing appropriate 
technologies to track and audit timber production destined for export to the EU.28  
While the initial design and testing of the TLAS has focused on timber destined for the EU, 
stakeholders in both Ghana and the EU have raised concerns about the large quantities of illegal 
timber traded in domestic markets and overland (Hansen et al., 2012; Hansen and Treue, 2008).29 
Ghana has therefore decided to include all wood production, including for domestic markets, within 
the VPA and TLAS. In other words, the goal in future is to eradicate informal on-farm timber 
production and chainsaw logging altogether, by ensuring that only licensed timber is sold both 
internationally and domestically.  
                                                          
28 Interview: #15511_1  
29 Interviews: #15610_1 and #17316_1  
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Given that, as mentioned above, some 84% of Ghana’s domestic timber production is currently 
informal, i.e. ‘illegal’, this is an ambitious goal indeed. Our interviews with the Forestry Commission 
and review of grey and academic literature suggest that as yet no estimates have been made of the 
costs of incorporating all of Ghanaian timber production under the TLAS, nor how such costs would 
be financed. Nor have we uncovered assessments of the political or technical feasibility of rapid and 
effective enforcement of legality within the domestic market. However, what is clear from the 
previous sections’ analyses of on-farm and domestic timber production, is that if the VPA continues 
on its current trajectory and proves effective in enforcing its current legal framework, and 
prosecuting illegal production, this could have severe negative effects on farmers’ rights and 
benefits from the trees on their farm, as well as on domestic access to timber resources. 
Previous studies of the FLEGT VPA’s social impacts have focused simply on farmer incomes over a 
one-year study period (e.g. (Hansen et al., 2015)). This research has shown that the existing bundles 
of rights and their contextual mediation already marginalise farmers. Hence they conclude the 
impact of any policy on farmer income from trees is inevitably small because the ‘baseline’ is already 
extremely low. They therefore argue that policy reforms focused on strengthening farmers’ rights to 
trees will have much greater impact than programmes focused on providing farmers with 
alternative, non-timber sources of income.  
Our findings are certainly in line with arguments for policy reform. In a counter-factual context 
where benefits flowed to farmers in a way that was commensurate to their current informal 
substantive and procedural rights to their trees, then the impact of curtailing those benefits through 
full implementation of the VPA would be quite significant. In fact, the granting of government 
concessions for trees nurtured by farmers from this perspective looks more like theft than good 
governance. But even beyond this, we argue that a focus solely on annual farmer incomes from 
timber is inadequate to capture the potential negative impacts of full VPA enforcement on business 
as usual. Timber is a long-rotation crop that may be used by rural households as a source of 
insurance to draw upon during times of crisis or special needs, e.g. during times of crop failure, or 
for weddings, funerals. Furthermore, farmers – like the majority of Ghanaian consumers - also rely 
on ‘illegal’ timber for their wood supply, and poor farmers in particular can ill afford to travel long 
distances for replacement products. But perhaps most importantly for the farmers themselves, our 
evidence suggests that existing informal systems of tree governance have granted many farmers a 
sense of power and control over their farmlands and the trees they nurture within them that would 
be largely lost if the current legal framework was effectively enforced. In sum, efforts to capture all 
of Ghana’s timber production under the VPA risks deepening existing marginalisation and criminality 
of resource users, many of whom are poor.  
 
7. Conclusions  
Calls for formalisation, including the overriding of customary rules and norms with statutory law and 
the prosecution of illegal activities, are becoming increasingly hegemonic as the favoured means to 
deliver control to higher level actors, often in pursuit of sustainability. However, there is concern 
that formalisation, by ignoring local dynamics of resource governance, might fail to deliver the 
desired levels of control to regional, national and international bodies. Furthermore, as the blanket 
chainsaw ban in Ghana demonstrates, formalisation can serve to criminalise and marginalise already 
poor resource users. Using a unique framework which recognises the importance of distinguishing 
between formal-informal and substantive-procedural rights and how contextual factors shape their 
realisation across scales and levels, this study sheds light on the governance of on-farm timber in 
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Ghana’s cocoa landscape, with major implications for how it might interact with international 
initiatives focused on legal formalisation.  
The analysis demonstrates how informal rights to trees, wrapped up with customary land tenure 
arrangements, deliver greater levels of control to farmers than the formal procedural rights 
embodied in the SRAs. The case study material highlights how contextual factors such as land tenure 
arrangements and societal position of individuals, particularly paramount chiefs, in governance 
arrangements, mediates the operation of rights at a local level. In general, farmers access the vast 
majority of benefits from trees on their farms through informal channels. However, quantifying the 
value of timber at various levels of the timber value chain demonstrates how weak and variable 
farmers’ bundles of rights are in practice. 
The intended trajectory of the VPA, which is to include the entire wood production sector under the 
timber legality assurance system, implies the eradication of informal on-farm timber production. 
This, if implemented, would further undermine the already tenuous levels of control farmers have 
over their trees and the benefits associated with them. The issues facing the pursuit of sustainable 
forest management reach beyond legal non-compliance and raise critical questions of equity when 
the power of different groups to define what constitutes formal rights and laws, and then harness 
them, is deeply asymmetrical. Focussing efforts in the timber sector on enforcement of existing laws 
such as the payment of compensation, while well intentioned, actually obfuscates the inequalities 
enshrined in the existing legal framework.    
Is there an effective way forward that escapes the hegemonic logic of formalisation? Differentiating 
between diverse wood production systems would allow for a more nuanced assessment of the 
appropriate arrangements of formal-informal and substantive-procedural rights to be pursued in 
combination with an understanding of how local contexts shape the actual realisation of rights at a 
local level. The most appropriate strategies for governing on-farm timber to addressing concerns 
about livelihoods and illegality are surely different from strategies in uninhabited forest production 
reserves. A differentiated approach would permit a degree of flexibility that is currently lacking. 
Long-standing debates about tree tenure in Ghana have, thus far, focused on reforming formal 
substantive rights at a national level. Formalising farmers’ substantive rights to the trees on their 
farms, as suggested in the VPA, would have positive impacts for some farmers who are successful in 
staking their claims, especially in cases where contestations over customary rights prevent the flow 
of benefits over trees they nurture. However, the analysis offered in this paper suggests that 
regardless of whether or not success is achieved at a national level, it would be possible to 
complement these efforts by devolving procedural control over trees on farms to local communities 
(i.e. farmers and traditional authorities), allowing them to govern tree harvests through their 
existing informal governance systems. This would effectively reflect the current situation of land 
rights in Ghana where customary rights to land are formally recognised. Three primary steps that 
could be taken to achieve this are, the phasing out of on-farm timber concessions, formal 
recognition of farmers’ existing yet informal rights over trees and de-criminalising chainsaw milling 
on farms. Given the current de facto rights farmers have over their trees, there is no reason to 
suggest that adopting these measures would increase deforestation on cocoa farms. In general, this 
case challenges the assertion that formalisation is requisite for sustainable forest management and 
mandates a more nuanced and contextually informed assessment of the assumed costs and benefits 
associated with particular forms of legal and policy reform. 
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Supplementary material 1.  
Farmers’ preferences for retaining and removing particular tree species. From household survey 
data.  
Species (local 
name in Twi) 
% stating 
preference 
to keep 
species: 
Top reasons for keeping 
(% of respondents who 
mentioned species 
mentioning reason) 
 Species (local 
name in Twi) 
% stating 
preference 
to remove 
species: 
Top reasons for removing (% 
of respondents who 
mentioned species giving the 
reason) 
Terminalia 
ivorensis  
(Emire) 
53% Timber (60%)  
Shade (51%)  
Soil fertility (26%)  
Good for water on the 
farm (25%)  
 Cola nitida 
(Bese) 
25% Competes with cocoa (59%)  
Too much shade (45%) 
Reduces soil fertility (45%)  
Reduces water availability on 
the farm (30%)  
Increases incidence of pests 
(30%) 
Terminalia 
superba 
(Ofram) 
46% Shade (61%)  
Timber (59%)  
Soil fertility (24%)  
Good for water on the 
farm (22%)  
 Triplochiton 
scleroxylon 
(Wawa) 
21% Reduces water availability on 
the farm (41%)  
Increases incidence of pests 
(36%) 
Competes with cocoa (31%) 
Too much shade (27%)  
Reduces soil fertility (27%) 
Milicia regia 
(Odum) 
31% Timber (94%)  
Shade (58%)  
Soil fertility (31%) 
Provides cash income 
(15%)  
Good for water on the 
farm (12%) 
 Ceiba 
pentandra 
(Onyina) 
20% Too much shade (71%)  
Fear felling will damage 
cocoa crops (33%) 
Competes with cocoa (29%) 
Increases incidence of pests 
(24%) 
Reduces availability of water 
on the farm (14%) 
Triplochiton 
scleroxylon 
(Wawa) 
18% Timber (79%)  
Shade (53%)  
Good for water on the 
farm (26%)  
Soil fertility (11%) 
 Alstonia 
boonei 
(Nyame dua) 
11% Too much shade (75%)  
Reduces soil fertility (33%)  
Increases incidence of pests 
(17%) 
Poor timber species (17%) 
Ceiba 
pentandra 
(Onyina) 
15% Shade (96%)  
Good for water on the 
farm (69%) 
Soil fertility (50%)  
Timber (31%) 
Biodiversity (13%)  
 Rauvolfia 
vomitoria 
(Kakapenpen) 
10% Too much shade (64%)  
Increases incidence of pests 
(36%) 
Fear felling will damage 
cocoa (27%) 
Nesogordonia 
papaverifera 
(Danta) 
15% Timber (74%)  
Shade (67%)  
Soil fertility (33%) 
Soil erosion (33%) 
Good for water on the 
farm (20%) 
 Milicia regia 
(Odum) 
10% Don't know/No answer 
(41%); Competes with cocoa 
(19%); Reduces soil fertility 
(15%); Too much shade (11%) 
 
 
